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Sollars: Natural Resources - To Take or Not To Take - Was That Question Re

CASENOTE
NATURAL RESOURCES-To Take or Not to Take-Was That
Question Really Worth 140 Million Dollars? Whitney
Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991).'
Whitney Benefits, Inc. is the owner in fee of a large coal reserve
underlying 1,327 acres in the Powder River Basin of Sheridan County,
Wyoming. 2 A substantial portion of the reserve is located beneath an
alluvial valley floor (AVF) of the Tongue River. 3 AVFs are located
where clay, silt, sand, gravel, and other materials carried by water are
deposited beneath the streams and/or along stream meanders. AVFs
are also found where ground water is close to the surface.4 In 1974,
Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. (PKS) leased the rights to mine the Whitney
Benefits, Inc. reserves in exchange for advance and operating royalties.5 In further preparation of mining, PKS conducted exploration
tests and purchased land overlying the Whitney Benefits, Inc. coal
reserves.' PKS submitted a coal mining permit application to Wyoming's Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) in March of
1976. 7 For procedural reasons, PKS withdrew the permit application
1. The 1991 decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
is the final decision of the Whitney Benefits trilogy. The first decision is a federal
circuit appeal from a 1984 unpublished decision of the United States Claims Court:
Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 752 F.2d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1985). [Hereinafter
Whitney Benefits 1.] The Whitney Benefits I court remanded the case back to the
Claims Court where the second decision of the trilogy was decided: Whitney Benefits,
Inc. v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 394 (1989). [Hereinafter Whitney Benefits I.] The
third decision affirmed the Claims Court's 1989 decision: Whitney Benefits, Inc. v.
United States, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991).
[Hereinafter Whitney Benefits III.]
2. Whitney Benefits 11, 18 Cl. Ct. 394, 396 (1989). Whitney Benefits, Inc. is a
charitable trust created in 1928 from the estate of Edward A. Whitney. Id.
3. Id.

4. See H.R. Rep. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 118-19 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 593, 650-51. AVFs are critical to the agriculture of the arid and semi-arid
climates because of the ability of the soils to store water during dry months. See also
Jack C. Schmidt and David Nimick, Overview of the Alluvial Valley Floor Regulatory
Program,in I COAL DEVELOPMENT: COLLECTED PAPERS: PAPERS PRESENTED AT COAL DEIN GRAND JUNCTION, COLORADO AND CASPER, WYOMING 691,
693-96 (1983) (sponsored by Bureau of Land Management). The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) defines alluvial valley floors as "the unconsolidated stream laid deposits holding streams where water availability is sufficient for
subirrigation or flood irrigation agricultural activities .... " 30 U.S.C. § 1291(1) (1988).
5. Whitney Benefits II, 18 Cl. Ct. at 397. From 1974 until the time of trial, PKS
paid Whitney Benefits $581,798.80. Id. at 397 n.2.
6. Id. at 397. PKS reportedly spent one million dollars for the preliminary tests.
Additionally, by 1977 PKS owned approximately 590 acres overlying the coal. PKS
planned to use the surface property to facilitate access to the underground reserves.
VELOPMENT WORKSHOPS

Id.

7. Id. The State Department of Environmental Quality is Wyoming's regulatory
agency responsible for issuing coal mining permits and for supervising mining opera-
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in August of the same year but expressed an intent to refile.8 However, on August 3, 1977, Congress enacted the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act (SMCRA)Y PKS was then required to meet SMCRA's permitting requirements, one of which precluded surface mining in areas located within or adjacent to AVFs.10
Congress recognized the critical function of AVFs to western agriculture" and enacted legislation to address the concern. Specifically,
SMCRA's section 510(b) mandates denial of a permit application if
the mining operation would "interrupt, discontinue, or preclude farming on alluvial valley floors ...."12 But at the time SMCRA was enacted, some coal mines were already operating on AVFs and other
mines were well beyond the preliminary planning stage. Acknowledging this, Congress included a grandfather provision13 and a coal exchange program.'
The coal exchange program provides for the exchange of mineable
federal coal leases for fee title of coal which cannot be mined due to
the AVF prohibition. 5 The exchange is made pursuant to the general
provisions of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
(FLPMA)'6 and to the Coal Lease and Coal Land Exchanges program." PKS believed the Whitney Benefits, Inc. reserves qualified for
the program. However, to be eligible, the reserves had to be declared
"non-mineable" by the regulatory agency."8 Thus, PKS submitted a
tions. Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-106 (1988).
8. Whitney Benefits 11, 18 Cl. Ct. at 397.
9. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91
Stat. 445 (codified at 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201-1328 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991)). The underlying purpose of SMCRA is to protect the environment while assuring an adequate
supply of coal for the nation's energy requirements. 30 U.S.C. § 1202 (1988).
10. 30 U.S.C. § 1260(b)(5) (1988). The AVF mining restriction applies to proposed
operations located west of the 100th meridian west longitude. Id.
11. AVFs were discussed thoroughly during SMCRA's congressional hearings. See
H.R. Rep. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 59-60, 116-20 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 593, 597-98, 649-52. A 1974 National Academy of Science report emphasized the potential deleterious effects of surface mining on the hydrologic functions of
AVFs in the western states. Id. at 118, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 650.
12. 30 U.S.C. § 1260(b)(5) (1988).
13. The grandfather provision relates to mines operating on AVFs at the time of
SMCRA's passage. Mining in or adjacent to AVFs is allowed to continue if (1) the
operation was producing coal in commercial quantities prior to SMCRA's enactment or
(2) the operation had previously obtained specific approval by the State regulatory
authority. 30 U.S.C. § 1260(b)(5) (1988). As originally proposed, the grandfather clause
would have also included operators who had made "substantial legal and financial
commitments ..."but who had not received a permit. Whitney Benefits I1, 926 F.2d
at 1173 (quoting 123 CONG. REC. 12,638-39).
14. The coal exchange program is available to qualified applicants if the Secretary
"determines that substantial financial and legal commitments were made ... prior to
January 1, 1977 ...." 30 U.S.C. § 1260(b)(5) (1988).
15. 30 U.S.C. § 1260(b)(5) (1988).
16. References to the exchange provision in FLPMA provide that an AVF exchange will be of equal value. 43 U.S.C. § 1716 (1988).
17. The Coal Lease and Coal Land Exchanges regulations specifically state that
"[elxchanges shall be made on an equal value basis." 43 C.F.R. § 3436.2-3(e) (1991).
18. Whitney Benefits II, 18 Cl. Ct. at 398. In reponse to PKS' eligibility inquiry,

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol27/iss2/6

2

Sollars: Natural Resources - To Take or Not To Take - Was That Question Re
1992

CASENOTE

second application in October of 1978.1' The Wyoming DEQ denied
the permit application in January of 1979, partly because "a large portion of the operation was located within an alluvial valley floor which
is significant to farming.""0 At that time, the Wyoming DEQ requested that the Secretary of the Interior consider the Whitney Benefits reserves for eligibility in the exchange program.2 1 PKS submitted
a request for an AVF exchange in July of 198122 and approximately
one month later, the Secretary determined that the Whitney Benefits
operation met the statutory requirements for a coal exchange.2 3 The
search for an exchange began in January of 1982.4
To further protect its coal mining interests, Whitney Benefits
filed a takings claim against the United States in the United States
Claims Court. Whitney Benefits claimed that SMCRA's enactment
resulted in a taking of the company's ability to mine the reserves. In a
bench ruling, the Claims Court denied Whitney Benefits' just-compensation claim.2" Whitney Benefits appealed the decision to the

the Wyoming DEQ and the Department of Interior's Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) interpreted SMCRA's exchange provision in this manner. Id. The actual regulations for federal fee coal exchanges were not promulgated until 1982. 47 Fed. Reg.
33,145 (1982) (codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3436.2 (1991)).
19. The permit application concerned Parcel II, East Whitney, of the property.
Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. Hodel, No. C84-193-K, slip op. at 3 (D. Wyo. May 23, 1985)
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law). The Whitney Benefits' coal reserves were
divided into two parcels, West Whitney and East Whitney (Parcel I and Parcel II,
respectively). Whitney Benefits 11, 18 Cl. Ct. at 396.
20. Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. Hodel, No. C84-193-K, slip op. at 3 (D. Wyo. May
23, 1985) (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law).
21. Id. See also Whitney Benefits 11, 18 Cl. Ct. at 398.
22. Whitney Benefits 1[, 18 Cl. Ct. at 398. PKS could not officially apply for an
exchange until regulations were made available for use in 1981. Trial Transcript of
July 23, 1987 Hearing at 62, Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. Hodel, No. C84-0193-K (D. Wyo.
1987).
23. Whitney Benefits 1H, 18 Cl. Ct. 398. The exchange request and the Wyoming
BLM State Director's subsequent approval included both Parcel I and Parcel II.
Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. Hodel, No. C84-193-K, slip op. at 3-4 (D. Wyo. May 23, 1985)
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law).
24. Id. at 4. Initially, both parcels were included in the exchange. However, eight
months after the exchange process began, the District Manager of BLM determined
only part of the property qualified for the exchange. Id. Whitney Benefits' pursuit of
an exchange was delayed pending deliberations of the AVF qualifications. Id. at 4-6. In
June of 1983, eighteen months after Whitney Benefits applied for the program, the
District Manager redetermined that both parcels qualified. Id. at 6. The exchange process resumed at that time. Brief in Opposition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Whitney
Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1554 (Fed. Cir.) (No. 91-195), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 406 (1991). From the time of SMCRA's enactment to the resumption of the
exchange program, nearly six years had elapsed. Id.
25. Whitney Benefits II, 18 Cl. Ct. at 398. The action was filed on August 3, 1983,
exactly six years after the enactment of SMCRA, to protect Whitney Benefits' justcompensation claim from the six-year statute of limitations. Brief in Opposition, supra
note 24, at 6 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2501). The Claims Court has exclusive jurisdiction of
Fifth Amendment just-compensation claims against the government. Tucker Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1988).
26. In the unreported decision, the Claims Court determined that Whitney Benefits must pursue the coal exchange program for its compensation; a claim could not be
made under the Tucker Act until the statutory remedy was exhausted. See Whitney
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United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Whitney Benefits I).27 While Whitney Benefits' just-compensation appeal was
pending in the federal circuit court, Whitney Benefits filed a second
lawsuit in the United States District Court under the citizen's suit
provision of SMCRA.25 The basis of the citizen's suit was to force the
2
government to comply with the coal exchange program. "
In January of 1985, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
reversed the Claims Court's denial of pecuniary relief."0 The federal
circuit court remanded the case back to the Claims Court to allow
Whitney Benefits to pursue its just-compensation claim." Whitney
Benefits also prevailed in the United States District Court. The district court ordered the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) of the
Department of the Interior to comply with SMCRA's coal exchange
program."2 Negotiations for a coal exchange continued, 3 but in 1987,
pending the
the United States District Court stayed the proceedings
34
outcome of the remanded just-compensation claim.
The remanded claim was decided in 1989 (Whitney Benefits II).5
The Whitney Benefits II court held that a compensable taking ocBenefits 1, 752 F.2d at 1556.

27. 752 F.2d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit retains exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from the Claims Court. 28
U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) (1988).
28. Whitney Benefits 11, 18 Cl. Ct. at 398. The citizen's suit provides the district
court with "the authority to compel compliance with the provisions of SMCRA when
the Secretary has failed to perform any nondiscretionary act or duty." Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. Hodel, No. C84-193-K, slip op. at 8 (D. Wyo. May 23, 1985) (Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law). See 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1988) (citizen's suit provision of
SMCRA).
29. Whitney Benefits II, 18 Cl. Ct. at 398.
30. Whitney Benefits 1, 752 F.2d at 1560.

31. Id. In Whitney Benefits I, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit stated
that the exchange program was not the exclusive, mandatory remedy for the property
owner. The property owner could pursue a claim for pecuniary compensation. Id. at
1558.
32. Whitney Benefits v. Hodel, No. C84-193-K (D. Wyo. May 23, 1985) (Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law). The district court declared that the BLM "has unreasonably delayed and failed to perform the mandatory duty to exchange federal coal
for [Whitney Benefits'] fee coal." Id. at 8. The court ordered the BLM to "tender
federal coal of equal value to [Whitney Benefits'] coal [by] August 30, 1985." Id. at 9.
See Whitney Benefits H, 18 Cl. Ct. at 398.

33. Whitney Benefits H, 18 Cl. Ct. at 398-99. In December, 1985, the federal district court again ordered the Department of the Interior to exchange coal. Whitney
Benefits, Inc. v. Hodel, No. C84-193-K (D. Wyo. Dec. 3, 1985) (order ruling on motion
to compel compliance).
34. Brief for Petitioners for Writ of Certiorari at 9, Whitney Benefits, Inc. v.
United States, 926 F.2d 1554 (Fed. Cir.) (No. 91-195), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 406
(1991).
35. 18 Cl. Ct. 394 (1989). The Whitney Benefits II court evaluated three factors to
determine if the regulatory restriction amounted to a compensable taking: (1) the economic impact of the restriction on the claimant's property; (2) the restriction's interference with investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character of the government's action. Id. at 399 (citing Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211,
225 (1986); see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978)).
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curred upon the enactment of SMCRA. 36 It calculated that the government's taking amounted to $60,296,000.00. 37 The court also
awarded the plaintiffs interest38 and attorney's fees, 39 for a grand total
exceeding $140 million.4' The government appealed the Claims Court
decision to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit which then
affirmed the lower court's decision (Whitney Benefits III).4 1 Subsequently, the government appealed the federal circuit court's affirmation to the United States Supreme Court. On November 6, 1991, the
government's petition for certiorari was denied.'
As is evident from the previous discussion, the facts and circumstances surrounding the Whitney Benefits litigation are far from simple. However, complex facts are generally the backbone of all takings
cases. The courts have historically evaluated each case on an ad-hoc, 4
fact-dependent basis, and the Whitney Benefits' litigation is no exception in that regard. But the litigation is exceptional because the
Claims Court and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit carried
the ad-hoc analysis beyond the takings precedent. This casenote discusses how the courts sidestepped congressional intent and takings
precedent to hold that SMCRA's enactment constituted a taking of
Whitney Benefits' property. It also addresses other possible reasons
for the result-orientated decision. Ultimately, this casenote suggests
that the real message of the Whitney Benefits trilogy of decisions is a
somber one for environmental regulatory programs. If the Claims
Court intends to find a compensable taking, it will use selected por36. Whitney Benefits 11, 18 Cl. Ct. at 406-07. To determine the date of taking, the
Claims Court followed the mandate of the Whitney Benefits I court that "the time
when economic development [is] effectually prevented [is] the date of the taking."
Whitney Benefits 1, 752 F.2d at 1559.

37. Whitney Benefits 1I, 18 Cl. Ct. at 416. The Claims Court followed the precedent of the United States Supreme Court that "just compensation" means the full
monetary equivalent of the property taken and placing the owner in the same financial
position as if there had been no taking. Id. at 407. To ascertain the amount, the court
reviewed the proposals using the Boyd Plan as its basis. Id. at 400-16. The Boyd Plan
is a fair market valuation method which incorporates a discounted cash flow analysis.
Id. at 400 n.5.
38. Id. at 416-17. When a claim against the United States is based on the Fifth
Amendment, an award of just compensation entitles the property owner to interest
from the date of the taking to the date of payment of judgment. Thus, Whitney Benefits was entitled to pre-judgment interest from August 3, 1977, the date of SMCRA's
enactment. Id.
39. Id. at 417. Whitney Benefits is entitled to attorney's fees and costs. Id. (citing
42 U.S.C. § 4654(c) (1982)).
40. Decision Awarding $140 Million For Taking Will Not Be Reviewed, U.S. Supreme Court Says, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1,751 (Nov. 8, 1991).
41. Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991).
42. United States v. Whitney Benefits, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991). Justice White
and Justice Blackmun would have granted certiorari.
43. The phrase "ad hoc" is found throughout takings decisions. "Ad hoc" means
the inquiry depends "upon the particular circumstances of each case." See Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1977) (citing United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958) and referring to United States v.
Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 156 (1952)).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1992

5

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 27 [1992], Iss. 2, Art. 6
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXVIl

tions of the takings doctrine to accomplish that result. Furthermore, if
the Claims Court's ad hoc analysis is well presented, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit will not hesitate to affirm the holding,
even when the cost to the taxpayers is significant.
BACKGROUND

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution precludes the government from taking personal property without just
compensation." The earliest takings cases involved the government's
4 6
exercise of eminent domain4 5 and actual physical occupation. In
those cases, taking by the government was readily discernable and
commensurate compensation easily determined.4 7 Conversely, inverse
condemnation claims against governmental invasion or laws and regulations often were not successful. Even though the government foreclosed, inhibited, curtailed, or otherwise interfered with private property, the courts generally held such activity or laws and regulations to
be a lawful exercise of police power. 8 The principles of the earlier
regulatory takings cases continue to be critical when evaluating regulations such as SMCRA's alluvial valley floor mining preclusion.
Mugler v. Kansas49 was one of the first United States Supreme
Court cases to address compensable regulatory takings. The Court
held that a regulation which was found to promote the health, safety,
and welfare of the public could not constitute a taking of one's property.50 But the Court's strict view began to change upon the advent of
increasing governmental regulation and supervision, and the new leadership of Justice Holmes." Justice Holmes' view was espoused in the
landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon:52 "[t]he
44. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

45. The distinction between eminent domain and inverse condemnation was described in Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 258 n.2 (1979): "Eminent domain refers to a
legal proceeding in which a government asserts its authority to condemn property. Inverse condemnation is 'a shorthand description of the manner in which a landowner
recovers just compensation for a taking of his property when condemnation proceedings have not been instituted.'" (citing United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 255-58
(1980)). Inverse condemnation can be further divided into two categories: (1) physical
invasion by the government; or (2) regulatory takings. See E. George Rudolph, Let's
Hear it for Due Process-An Up to Date Primer on Regulatory Takings, 23 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 355, 363, 379 (1988).
46. Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 36 (1964).
47. Id.
48. Id.

49. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
50. Id. at 668-69. In Mugler, a Kansas distiller built a brewery while it was legal
to manufacture and distribute liquor. The distiller unsuccessfully challenged later regulations promulgated in response to a Kansas constitutional amendment. The amendment prohibited the sale and manufacture of intoxicating liquors. Id. at 671.
51. Sax, supra note 46, at 40. Holmes' fairness approach viewed regulatory taking
as varying in degree, not in kind, from physical taking and thus adopted a broader
stance toward compensation. Id. at 40-41.
52. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Professor Sax discussed Holmes' "fairness" view and the
emphasis that Holmes placed upon "economic harm inflicted by the regulation." Sax,
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general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent,
if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
53
taking.
In Pennsylvania Coal, the Court addressed the company's mining
interests which were adversely affected by the passage of the Kohler
Act. The surface owners sought the use of the Kohler Act to preclude
mining beneath their land.5 4 Writing for the majority, Justice Holmes
conceded that the government could not continue to operate if each
and every diminution in property value that resulted from a change in
law required compensation. However, Holmes stated that "when [the
extent of the diminution] reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not
in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act."55 The Court held that the Kohler Act exceeded that level of magnitude.5 With those words, Justice Holmes
set the stage for future regulatory takings cases. To determine if a
regulation's impact went "too far," courts continued to analyze cases
in a factually intense, ad hoc manner.5 7If the court held that a taking
occurred, just compensation was due.
The economic evaluation approach to regulatory takings was further refined in Penn Central TransportationCo. v. New York City. 8
In Penn Central, the Court balanced the validity and purpose of New
York City's Landmarks Preservation Law against the property
owner's investment in the Grand Central Terminal.59 Noting that no
"set formula" existed for determining when compensation was due,
the Court then identified three main factors which required evaluation: (1) economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the
extent the regulation interferes with investment-backed expectations;
and (3) the character of the governmental action.6 0 After evaluating
the factors, the Penn Central Court held that no compensable taking
supra note 46, at 40-41.
53. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
54. The state of Pennsylvania's Kohler Act was enacted to prevent subsidence
damage. The Kohler Act prohibited mining beneath public structures and private
dwellings. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 393-94 n.1. In Pennsylvania Coal, the plaintiff's surface property had been severed from the support and mineral estate prior to
enactment of the Kohler Act. Id. at 412.
55. Id. at 413.
56. Id. at 414. Justice Brandeis dissented, stating that restrictions to protect the
public health, safety or morals could not amount to a taking. Additionally, because a
restriction did not deprive the owner of possession, the sovereign never "took" the
property. Id. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 413-16 (Holmes, J., majority).
58. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
59. The law required an owner of a designated landmark to obtain prior approval
from the Landmarks Preservation Commission before making any exterior alterations.
Id. at 112. The Grand Central Terminal was designated as a landmark and, as required, Penn Central submitted building plans for a multi-story office building over
the terminal. The commission rejected the plans. Id. at 116-18. Subsequently, Penn
Central filed suit, claiming that the Landmarks Law had taken its property without
just compensation. Id. at 119.
60. Id. at 124.
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had occurred. Penn Central's investment was not substantially impaired; the company still had reasonable use of the Grand Central
Terminal and the company would be able to enhance other company
properties." Justice Rehnquist, writing in dissent, 62 believed the use
restriction amounted to a compensable taking and the transferable3
development rights might not constitute full and fair compensation.e
The ad hoc inquiry and takings evaluation factors enunciated in
Penn Central have carried through to other regulatory takings cases.
In Agins v. City of Tiburon,"' a unanimous Supreme Court held that
density restrictions did not amount to a taking even though the landowners were precluded from extensive residential development.6 5 Although the ordinance did limit development, there was no indication
66
that the owner was denied economically viable use of the land.
Five years later, the Supreme Court decided Connolly v. Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corp.6 7 The Court applied the Penn Central factors
against the withdrawal liability provisions of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act and held that no compensable taking resulted. Connolly did not show that the economic imposition was significant enough to amount to a taking and the Court found that the
regulation did not substantially interfere with the employers' investment-backed expectations."
In 1987, the Supreme Court evaluated the economic viability
61. The Court evaluated the company's entire property to conclude that the investment was not substantially impaired by the regulation. Id. at 130-31, 136-38. The
enhancement of other properties referred to the use of Penn Central's transferable
development rights (TDRs). Id. at 129. The majority perceived the TDRs to be a
means of compensation for any property value reduction caused by the Landmarks
Law. Id. at 137. However, the Court acknowledged that a taking might be found in the
future if "circumstances have so changed" to make the permitted use no longer "economically viable." Id. at 138 n.36.
62. Id. at 138-53 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens joined Justice Rehnquist in the dissent.
63. Id. at 149-52.
64. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). Agins purchased land apparently with an intent to develop a high-density residential area. Following the purchase, the city enacted a zoning
ordinance which restricted the residential densities of Agins' land. Agins filed suit,
complaining that rezoning of the land "forever prevented [its] development for residential use ...." Id.at 258.
65. The Agins Court balanced a proper exercise of police power against the plaintiff's reasonable investment expectations. The Court found that the restriction on use
did not amount to substantial economic diminution. Id. at 260-63.
66. Id. at 262. The Court found that the regulation did not prevent the best use
nor extinguish a fundamental attribute of ownership. The property owners were still
free to pursue their reasonable investment expectations. Id.
67. 475 U.S. 211 (1986). In Connolly, a regulation required that an employer withdrawing from a multiemployer pension plan pay a fixed and certain debt to the pension plan. The provision was enacted to ensure that adequate funds would be available
for future use. Id. at 216-17. Connolly maintained that "the imposition of noncontractual withdrawal liability violates the Takings Clause by requiring employers to transfer
their assets for the private use of pension trusts and, . . . by requiring an uncompensated transfer." Id. at 221.
68. Id. at 225-27.
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prong when it decided Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v.
DeBenedictis.6" The coal association challenged a Pennsylvania Subsidence Act 70 which limited mining in certain areas. Compliance with
section four of the Act generally required coal mine operators to leave
fifty percent of the mining reserves as support.7 After limiting and
distinguishing Pennsylvania Coal, the Court balanced the purpose of
the Subsidence Act against the diminution in value and the interference with investment-backed expectations of Keystone Bituminous.7
The Court held that Keystone Bituminous' economic impact was not
73
significant enough to surmount a facial regulatory taking challenge.
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the dissent ' which contested the majority's characterization of the regulated activity as "akin to a public
nuisance." '77 The Chief Justice cited previous Supreme Court cases
where the "nuisance" classification was
instrumental to the Court's
7
holding that no taking had resulted. 1
The Supreme Court established the factually intensive, ad hoc inquiry of regulatory takings cases many years ago. Even though facts
and circumstances change, the basic principles enunciated in Pennsylvania Coal, refined in Penn Central, and emphasized in Agins con-

69. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
70. Id. at 474. The full name of the Act is the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and
Land Conservation Act. Id. (citing PA. STAT. ANN., Tit. 52, § 1406.1 et. seq. (Purdon
Supp. 1986)).
71. Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 476-77.
72. Id. at 484-88. To distinguish Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Stevens described the
different purposes for the legislative acts. The majority stated that the Kohler Act
evaluated in Pennsylvania Coal balanced private interests while the act at issue in
Keystone Bituminous weighed public interests against a private owner. Id. Conversely,
the dissent found the purposes of the acts to be similar. Id. at 509-11 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
73. Id. at 493-96 (Stevens, J., majority). Although Keystone Bituminous did show
that 27 million tons of coal would be left in place, that amount was only two percent of
the mineable reserves. Id. at 496.
74. Id. at 506-21 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined
by Justices Powell, O'Connor, and Scalia.
75. 1d. at 512-14.
76. Id. at 511-12 (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Hadacheck
v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)). Another case
which is often cited for the nuisance exception to a compensable taking is Miller v.
Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928). In Miller, the owners of red cedar trees were forced to
cut them down because the trees harbored cedar rust. The cedar rust was deadly to the
nearby cultivated apple trees. Id. at 277. In Keystone Bituminous, the dissenting Chief
Justice noted that the plaintiffs in Miller were still "able 'to use the felled trees.' "
Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 513 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Thus, economic
use was not totally extinguished.
Additionally, the Court disagreed on the evaluation of the independent support
rights. The majority refused to separate the support estate from the other strands in
the bundle of Keystone Bituminous' property rights. Id. at 496-98 (Stevens, J., majority). Conversely, the dissent would have characterized the independent support estate
as a property right subject to a taking. Id. at 517-20 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). For
a discussion of how the "Rehnquistian" segmented view of property rights affected the
Court's decision in Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987), see John H. Leavitt, Note,
Hodel v. Irving: The Supreme Court's Emerging Takings Analysis-A Question of How
Many Pumpkin Seeds per Acre, 18 ENVTL. L. 597 (1988).
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tinue to be important. The two-prong threshold test directs that a
regulatory taking may be found if "the [regulation] does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his [property] .'' 7 That same type of inquiry and
those same principles are essential to the holding of Whitney Benefits
III.
PRINCIPAL CASE

In Whitney Benefits III, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit held that a compensable taking of Whitney Benefits' property
resulted upon enactment of SMCRA. 78 At the onset, the Whitney
Benefits III court emphasized that the constitutionality of SMCRA
was not an issue nor was there any contention that the AVF mining
preclusion did not substantially advance a legitimate governmental
purpose.79 Rather, the case "presents a dispute where a proper government purpose, protecting agricultural land, must be balanced
against the absolute diminution [of the property's] value ...."8'
The federal circuit court's analysis of Whitney Benefits' takings
claim was divided into four major sections: (1) was a permit application denial required; (2) did SMCRA prohibit Whitney Benefits from
mining the Whitney Benefits, Inc. coal; (3) did SMCRA deprive
Whitney Benefits of all economic use of its property; and (4) did the
Claims Court consider Congress' motivation."s
Mining Permit
To begin, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit addressed
the government's argument that until the appropriate agency determination is made, a takings claim is not ripe for review. 2 To refute the
government's position, the court referred to the language of SMCRA
which expressly denies permit approval if mining would be conducted
on AVFs 3 The Whitney Benefits III court concurred with the Claims
Court that "it would be unreasonable under the particular facts of
this case to hold that a taking could not have occurred until a subsequent administrative determination was made that mining of Whitney
coal was prohibited."8
77. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260 (emphasis supplied). Evaluation of the second prong,
economic viability, concerns three factors: (1) economic impact; (2) interference with
investment-backed expectations; and (3) character of the government's action. See
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. See supra text accompanying note 60.
78. Whitney Benefits I1, 926 F.2d 1169, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 406 (1991).
79. Id. at 1170.
80. Id. at 1177 (quoting Whitney Benefits 11, 18 Cl. Ct. 394, 406 (1989)).
81. Whitney Benefits l11, 926 F.2d at 1171.
82. Id. at 1171-72.
83. Id. at 1171 n.3. See 30 U.S.C. § 1260(b) (1988).
84. Whitney Benefits II, 926 F.2d at 1172 (quoting Whitney Benefits II, 18 Cl.
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SMCRA Prohibited Mining of Whitney Benefits' Coal
The government claimed that the enactment of SMCRA, on its
own, did not prohibit mining of Whitney Benefits' coal.8" However,
the Claims Court reviewed the case under the assumed directive that
a taking occurs "when economic development [is] effectually prevented.""6 The Whitney Benefits III court affirmed the Claims
Court's finding that the
time of taking was August 3, 1977, the date of
8
SMCRA's enactment. 7
To support the Claims Court's findings, the Whitney Benefits III
court touched on three factors. 8 First, the government conceded that
SMCRA's enactment precluded mining of Whitney Benefits'
reserves.89 The BLM reported that "[d]evelopment of the [Whitney]
coal was halted by the passage of the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977. Section 510(b) of that Act prohibited all
surface mining in alluvial valley floors significant to farming."90 Secondly, physical facts presented at trial proved that the AVF prohibition applied directly to Whitney Benefits' property.9 The AVF "was
described as plain to the eye"9 2 and its former use was known to be
ranching and farming.9 3 As a third factor, the Whitney Benefits III
court evaluated SMCRA's legislative history. The court declared that
"SMCRA's legislative history confirmed the presence of a legislative
taking of the Whitney Coal property." '
In support of the third finding, the Whitney Benefits III court
referred to SMCRA's congressional hearings. During the hearings,
proposed Wyoming and Montana surface mining operations which
would be potentially affected by SMCRA's AVF provisions were identified and reviewed.95 The Whitney Benefits III court pointed out
that Wyoming's Representative Roncalio specifically addressed the efCt. at 417).
85. Whitney Benefits 11, 18 Cl. Ct. at 407. The government asserted that a taking
could not result until the permit application was denied. Id.
86. Id. at 406 (quoting Whitney Benefits 1, 752 F.2d 1554, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
87. Whitney Benefits I1, 926 F.2d at 1172. The federal circuit court agreed that
SMCRA's enactment deprived the company of "all economically viable use" of its
property. Id.
88. Id. at 1173-74.
89. Id. at 1173. The BLM published a Notice of Realty Action in the Federal
Register following the Wyoming District Court order which compelled the government
to tender federal coal pursuant to the AVF exchange provision. 51 Fed. Reg. 3124
(1986) (referring to Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. Hodel, No. C84-193-K (D. Wyo. May 23,
1985)).
90. 51 Fed. Reg. 3125 (1986).
91. Whitney Benefits I1, 926 F.2d at 1173.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1173-74.
95. Whitney Benefits 11, 926 F.2d at 1173 n.6 (citing Surface Mining Control &
Reclamation Act of 1977: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy & the Environment of the House Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Part II,
219-36 (1977)).
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fect of the proposed grandfather clause" on the "Whitney Benefits
mines on the Tongue River in Sheridan County in Northern Wyoming."9 7 As originally proposed, the grandfather clause would have allowed operators, such as Whitney Benefits, who had made "substantial legal and financial commitments," but who had not received a
permit, to be excluded from AVF mining preclusion.98 Representative
Roncalio was concerned that the protective umbrella of the proposed
grandfather clause would extend over the Whitney Benefits reserves
and urged that the provision be modified. 9 Subsequently, the grandfather clause was modified. The government attempted to minimize
the effect of Representative Roncalio's remarks, but the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was not convinced.1"'
SMCRA Deprived Whitney Benefits of All Economic Use
The government claimed that Whitney Benefits still retained valuable rights in the ability to farm the surface and to participate in
SMCRA's coal exchange program. 1 1 However, the Whitney Benefits
III court was not persuaded that valuable rights existed in either option. Noting that Whitney Benefits' takings claim concerned coal mining, the court believed that the government's reliance on the value of
the surface estate was misplaced. 20 The court pointed out that Wyoming state law recognizes severable surface and mineral rights and
thus, Whitney Benefits' claim could be based on the independent
mineral property right.0 3
Moreover, the Whitney Benefits III court did not agree that the
coal exchange program gave Whitney Benefits "something of significant value."'0 4 The court believed the comparison between the rights
retained by the company in Penn Central and Whitney Benefits'
rights in SMCRA's coal exchange program was inaccurate. The court
stated "the government apparently failed to notice that in Penn Central the owners retained the railroad station and that in this case the
96. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (describing the grandfather
clause).
97. Whitney Benefits 111, 926 F.2d at 1173 (citing 123 CONG. REc. 12,638-39
(1977)).
98. Id.

99. Id. Representative Roncalio also recommended an amendment that would
ensure the grandfather clause would not apply to Whitney Benefits' coal. Id. at 1174
(citing 123 CONG. REc. 12,638-39 (1977)). The court then stated that "[t]here never
was any doubt that adoption of his amendment would insure that the AVF prohibition
would apply full force to the Whitney coal property." Id. at 1174.
100. Whitney Benefits 11, 926 F.2d at 1174.

101. Id. See supra note 14 and text accompanying notes 14-17 (describing the coal
exchange program).
102. Whitney Benefits 11, 926 F.2d at 1174.

103. Id. (citing Williams v. Watt, 668 P.2d 620, 624-25 (Wyo. 1983) (severable
property rights are recognized in Wyoming) and Skaw v. United States, 740 F.2d 932
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (compensable takings may be found for mineral rights)).
104. Whitney Benefits

I1, 926 F.2d at 1175-76.
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Claims Court found a total destruction of [Whitney] Benefits' coal
property right."'' 0 1 Additionally, the Whitney Benefits III court interpreted the statutory language of the coal exchange program as allowing the government to acquire and exchange coal, not as giving the
operator something of value.' 6
Congress' Motivation
Finally, the government argued that Congress enacted SMCRA's
AVF mining preclusion with the intent of abating a nuisance,' 0 7 and
thus, no compensable taking could result."0 " The government relied
primarily on the first prong of regulatory takings analysis: no taking
can be found if the regulation substantially advances legitimate state
interests.' 0 9 To counter the government's "nuisance" position, the
Whitney Benefits III court referred to the purpose of SMCRA and
emphasized that abating a nuisance was not included." 0 Additionally,
the court noted that SMCRA expressly provided for limited AVF
mining and that an allowance would "hardly [be] the action of one out
to abate a 'nuisance' or anything 'injurious to the health, morals, or
safety of the community.'","
Also, the federal circuit court pointed out that the two prongs
were independent of one another." 2 The Claims Court used the second prong in its analysis to determine that the diminution of Whitney
Benefits' property value was absolute."' The Whitney Benefits III
court stated, "[t]hus Benefits is in the same position occupied by the
citizens in [Pennsylvania Coal], who were denied all economically viable use of their coal, and in a fundamentally different position from
that of the citizens in Keystone, who were not."".4

105. Id. at 1175. In Penn Central, the company could continue to use the station
providing the restrictions were not violated. Also, the company possessed transferrable
development rights which could be used to develop other, nonrestricted property.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
106. Whitney Benefits III, 926 F.2d at 1176. The language of the coal exchange
program reads: "It is the policy of Congress that the Secretary shall develop and carry
out a coal exchange program to acquire private fee coal precluded from being mined by
the [AVF restrictions] in exchange for Federal coal which is not so precluded." 30
U.S.C. § 1260(b)(5) (1988).
107. Whitney Benefits III, 926 F.2d at 1176-77.
108. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (referring to nuisance exception
for takings claims).
109. Whitney Benefits III, 926 F.2d at 1176.
110. Id. at 1177.
111. Id. (quoting Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 489).
112. Id. at 1176. "[T]hese are 'entirely separate question[s].' " Id. (quoting Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174 (1979)).
113. Id. at 1176-77.
114. Id. at 1176.
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ANALYSIS

An initial review of the Whitney Benefits litigation suggests that
the trilogy correctly followed the takings doctrine. Conversely, a more
critical review indicates that the analysis was flawed, particularly in
three aspects. First, the diminution of Whitney Benefits' property was
not total. Whitney Benefits did retain "something" of value both in
the coal exchange program and the use of the surface property. Second, the pecuniary award may not have been the proper remedy. The
courts did not consider the value of the coal exchange program as a
means of compensation. Moreover, the Claims Court went beyond its
own precedent in calculating the pecuniary award. Rather than limiting the award to the original permit application, the compensation
was based on the entire reserve, Third, pointed references to the government's actions suggest that other reasons may have influenced the
courts' result-orientated decisions. Perhaps the courts sought to fashion an equitable remedy of sorts to compensate for the government's
procrastination.
The Diminution of Whitney Benefits' Property Was Not Total
Because the Whitney Benefits trilogy of decisions did not adequately assess the value of the coal exchange program, the courts were
able to find a total diminution of Whitney Benefits' property. The
Whitney Benefits I court characterized SMCRA's coal exchange provision as analogous to the transferrable development rights (TDRs) of
Penn Central.115 In Penn Central, the property owners were precluded from full-scale development of the Grand Central Station but
were able to develop other, nonrestricted property through the use of
TDRs.1 16 Because of the value of the terminal and the TDRs, the Supreme Court determined no taking had resulted.1 1 7 In Whitney Benefits III, the court was unwilling to find that the coal exchange program represented "something of significant value." The court
distinguished Penn Central r9 and added that "in Penn Central the
owners retained the railroad station" while Whitney Benefits' coal
property right was totally destroyed.1 19 But the trilogy's perception of
the coal exchange program was incorrect. The legislative history demonstrates that the coal exchange program is akin to the Grand Central
Terminal itself, not merely transferable development rights.

115. Whitney Benefits 1, 752 F.2d 1554, 1557-58 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
116. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). See supra
text accompanying notes 58-63.
117. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
118. Whitney Benefits I1, 926 F.2d 1169, 1175 (Fed. Cir. 1991). As construed by
the Whitney Benefits III court, the first decision of the trilogy distinguished Penn
Central because New York City's "regulation [was] not meant to take an interest in
land." Id. (quoting Whitney Benefits I, 752 F.2d at 1557).
119. Whitney Benefits 111, 926 F.2d at 1175.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol27/iss2/6

14

Sollars: Natural Resources - To Take or Not To Take - Was That Question Re
1992

CASENOTE

Indeed, the sole function of the coal exchange program was to
give AVF-precluded operators something of value, the right to mine
coal. Congress specifically adopted the program to compensate coal
operators who had made legal and financial commitments toward mining of AVF reserves but who were not protected by the grandfather
clause.12 ° Discussions of the coal exchange program began when members of the House of Representatives spoke of the Secretary's willingness to "swap leases" and "[tihus, [the coal operators' investment]
damage, if any, would be minimized."' 2 ' The discourse surrounding
the program readily demonstrates Congress' intent to compensate
ousted operators by replacing the AVF coal with other, valuable coal
reserves." 2 The unwillingness of the Whitney Benefits III court to attribute value to the coal exchange program ' is simply inconsistent
with Congress' intent.
In Whitney Benefits I, dissenting Chief Judge Markey touched
on Congress' intent in enacting the program, 2 ' but for whatever reason, the inquiry stopped there." 25 Interestingly, although both the
Whitney Benefits II and Whitney Benefits III courts used selected
portions of SMCRA's legislative history to emphasize that Congress

120. As originally proposed, the grandfather clause would have allowed legally and
financially committed operators to pursue AVF mining. See supra notes 13, 14 and
accompanying text (describing the grandfather clause and enacted coal exchange
program).
121. 123 CONG. REc. 12,862 (1977).
122. In fact, Montana's Representative Baucus declared, "[i]n no way is this
amendment intended to exclude production permits." 123 CONG. REc. 12,862 (1977).
123. The federal circuit court pointed out that the government failed to provide
evidence of the program's value. Whitney Benefits 11, 926 F.2d at 1175. However, the
court did not need to look far to find the evidence. On June 23, 1989, (prior to the
Claims Court's decision) the Ash Creek Mining Company filed a suit in the Tenth
Circuit challenging the Interior Department's decision to exchange the Ash Creek coal
tract for the Whitney Benefits tract. Ash Creek Mining Co. v. Lujan, 934 F.2d 240, 242
(10th Cir. 1991). The owners of the surface property had intended to bid on the lease.
Id. at 241. The mere fact that a mining company would expend the time and effort to
protect the opportunity to bid on a coal lease plainly supports the program's value.
124. Whitney Benefits I at 1564 (Markey, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Judge
stated "[t]hat one denied the right to strip mine in a first location may choose to
compel the Secretary to grant the right to mine at a second location, and that the
Secretary shall receive in exchange the right to mine in the first location, does not
constitute a land acquisition or a program designed to acquire mining rights." Id. (referring to 123 CONG. REc. 15,755 (1977)).
125. To determine Congress' intent, the Chief Judge of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia discussed the importance of using legislative history. Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U.
L. REV. 277 (1990). "[T]he nearly universal view among federal judges is that when we
are called upon to interpret statutes, it is our primary responsibility, within constitutional limits, to subordinate our wishes to the will of Congress because the legislators'
collective intention, however discerned, trumps the will of the court." Id. at 281. However, Justice Scalia promotes an opposing view. Often joined by Justice Kennedy, Justice Scalia believes the "textual interpretation" of statutes should prevail. The Justice
believes judicial review should be limited to the "plain meaning" of words and if necessary, the general context of the statute should be reviewed, not legislative history. Id.
at 281-86.
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intended to preclude mining of AVF reserves,' 2 6 neither court used
the history to discern Congress' intent in establishing a coal exchange
program. Instead, the Whitney Benefits I court looked to other federal court cases to interpret the statutory language. Specifically, the
court pointed to Drakes Bay Land Co. v. United States 2 7 and Skaw
v. United States 28 to determine the meaning of the word
"acquire."" 29
The governing statutes of those two cases provided that the government would "acquire" land affected by the legislation. In both of
those statutes, funds were intentionally appropriated to accomplish
the acquisition. The Whitney Benefits I court reviewed this use of the
word "acquire" and then labeled SMCRA's coal exchange program as
"a method of ascertaining and paying just compensation for a taking
...
Ill 30But
notably, Congress did not allocate any funding to
purchase AVF-precluded fee coal.13 1 Once again, the court's failure to
review the legislative history skewed the analysis. The coal exchange
program was intended to replace the AVF-precluded reserves,' 3' not
126. See supra note 99 and text accompanying notes 95-99 (discussing the legislative history discourse of Whitney Benefits III). See also Whitney Benefits II, 18 Cl.
Ct. 394, 406-07 (1989). In Whitney Benefits III, the court placed considerable emphasis on the fact that the Congress knew which coal reserves would be impacted by the
AVF provision. Whitney Benefits III, 926 F.2d at 1173. This degree of emphasis is
puzzling because the very purpose of congressional hearings is to assimilate and discuss information relating to proposed statutes. It is hardly surprising that Whitney
Benefits' reserves were specifically mentioned. For a general discussion of the purpose
of congressional hearings, see MORRIs L. COHEN ET AL., FINDING THE LAW 223 (1989).
127. 424 F.2d 574 (Cl. Ct. 1970).
128. 740 F.2d 932 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
129. Whitney Benefits 1, 752 F.2d at 1559-60.
130. Whitney Benefits 1, 752 F.2d at 1560 (emphasis supplied) (approved in
Whitney Benefits II, 926 F.2d at 1175-76).
131. In fact, a review of the Congressional Record demonstrates that Congress was
concerned about the cost of land acquisition but not lor the coal exchange program.
The Senate thoroughly debated the financial ramifications of surface owner consent
relative to federally-owned coal. If Congress was discussing the potential purchase of
surface properties and the effect of the AVF mining preclusion during the same time
period, surely the "intent" to purchase AVF coal would have been at least mentioned.
However, the record is devoid of this. See generally 123 CONG. REC. 15,561-66, 15,56776, 15,731-38, 15,763-69, 23,971-76, 23,979-86 (Senate debates concerning privatelyowned surface but federally-owned coal and surface owner consent); 123 CONG. REc.
15,603-05, 15,611-13, 15,692-93, 15,695-97, 15,699-700, 15,751-53, 15,762-63 (Senate debates regarding AVF mining preclusion and coal exchange program); 123 CONG. REC.
12,638-39, 12,861-68, 24,420 (House of Representatives debate concerning AVF mining
preclusion and coal exchange program).
132. The constitutional impact of the AVF mining preclusion on leaseholders was
addressed in the Senate on May 20, 1977. During a colloquy concerning the "legal and
financial commitment" exclusion from the grandfather clause, Senators Burdick, Hart,
and Metcalf specifically discussed the constitutionality of the AVF prohibition. Senator Metcalf believed the AVF mining prohibition was well within the constitutional
bounds of zoning restrictions and the exercise of police power. However, Senator Burdick was not convinced that, without more, the prohibition was constitutional. Senator
Hart then discussed the coal exchange program to which Senator Burdick stated "[i]f
this could be exchanged for land of equal value, I think the constitutional test might
be met." 123 CONG. REc. 15,696 (1977). See generally 123 CONG. REc. 15,691-92,
15,695-96 (1977).
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to determine pecuniary compensation.
Thus, the finding that the value of Whitney Benefits' property
was totally destroyed was erroneous. A review of the legislative history
demonstrates that Congress' true intent in enacting the program was
to replace fully the AVF-precluded coal. Because Whitney Benefits retained the ability to mine coal, albeit a different reserve, Whitney
Benefits' "Grand Central Station" was never taken. Additionally, the
plaintiffs still held "TDRs," the AVF overlying the coal reserves. But
because the Whitney Benefits trilogy overlooked the legislative history
and facts, the courts failed to address the value of the AVF. The evaluation of the AVF may have been further flawed because the value of
the surface property was severed from that of the mineral estate, despite the fact that Whitney Benefits, Inc. and the coal operator, PKS,
joint plaintiffs in the action, together owned nearly the entire fee
estate."'
Congress expressly acknowledged the essential value of AVFs to
farming and ranching in the arid West 134 when it enacted the AVF
mining preclusion.' 35 The Whitney Benefits III court noted that the
AVF overlying the Whitney Benefits reserves had been studied by
Congress 3 6 and that the Whitney Benefits AVF had been used for
farming and ranching.13 7 Yet, the federal circuit court spurned the
government's argument that the plaintiffs' property retained some
value after SMCRA's enactment because the AVF could be farmed.
The Whitney Benefits III court stated the purchase of the surface
was only to facilitate mining, and because the takings claim concerned
the rights to mine, the surface value was limited to the investmentbacked expectations of the plaintiffs. 38
To limit its takings evaluation to the mineral property, the
Whitney Benefits III court referred to Wyoming state law which recognizes separate mineral and surface ownership.3 9 However, in the
Whitney Benefits litigation, the ownership of the surface and mineral
133. PKS owned nearly half of the surface property overlying the Whitney Benefits, Inc. reserves. Whitney Benefits III, 926 F.2d at 1174.
134. Congress specifically mentioned the valuable AVFs of the Yellowstone Valley, Tongue River Valley, Powder River Valley, and Rosebud Creek Valley and the
commensurate need to protect them. As stated by Montana's Representative Senator
Melcher, "those thin ribbons of irrigated land, surface or subirrigated, are extremely
important to the miles upon miles and millions upon millions of acres of western land
that flow out from either side of those narrow stream beds." 123 CONG. REC. 15,697
(1977).
135. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (referring to SMCRA's AVF protection provision).
136. Whitney Benefits III, 926 F.2d at 1173 and n.6.
137. Id. at 1173. "The AVF overlying most of the Whitney coal was described as
plain to the eye, and farming and ranching had long operated on the surface above the
Whitney coal." Id.
138. Id. at 1174.
139. Id. (citing Williams v. Watt, 668 P.2d 620, 624-25 (Wyo. 1983)). In Williams,
the dispute concerned solely the conveyance of mineral rights which were subject to a
reservation in the grantor. Williams, 668 P.2d. at 622.
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rights was not totally severed. By the time of trial, PKS owned nearly
half of the land overlying the coal reserves. 4 ° The dual ownership was
needed because in strip-mining procedures, the use of the surface
property is intrinsically tied to excavation of coal. In light of this dual
ownership, the court's analysis of the surface value would have been
more thorough if the court would have looked to other factually similar cases. Other state courts have evaluated a takings claim where the
plaintiff owned both properties.
For example, in Brecciaroli v. Connecticut Commission of Environmental Protection,' the plaintiffs were denied a permit to fill a
wetland. 4 The court found that other uses for the land existed and
thus no taking had resulted.'" Similarly, in Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles,"' a zoning ordinance prohibited the
proposed and continued mining of sand and gravel.' 4 5 The court noted
that the plaintiff could use the property for other uses, although those
uses were not as lucrative as mining. 4 6 In spite of the diminution of
value, the court did not find a taking.'"7 If the Whitney Benefits
courts had addressed fully the value of the AVF and the dual ownership, the courts would have acknowledged
that Whitney Benefits' eco4
nomic diminution was not total.' 1
But in their fervor to find a compensable taking, the trilogy failed
to address adequately the other items of value that Whitney Benefits
retained: the right to mine coal and the ability to make other uses of
the surface property. That intent to find a taking also influenced the
courts' remedy in other regards.
Whitney Benefits' Pecuniary Award May Not Have Been the Proper
Remedy
Because the Whitney Benefits trilogy misinterpreted the function
of the coal exchange program, the courts limited the remedy to pecuniary compensation. In Whitney Benefits I, the court referred to the
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases'49 and noted that situations
may exist where the sovereign power "can manage the property of cit140. Whitney Benefits III, 926 F.2d at 1174.
141. 362 A.2d 948 (1975).
142. Id. at 949-50.
143. Id. at 952-53.
144. 370 P.2d 342 (1962), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962).
145. Id. at 344.
146. Id. at 351.
147. The Supreme Court of California affirmed the lower court's decision that the
zoning regulation was not unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs. Id. at 344, 354.
148. The Supreme Court has refused to find a taking in cases where the diminution of value was nearly total. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company, 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Goldblatt v. Town of
Hempsted, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
149. Whitney Benefits 1, 752 F.2d at 1557 (citing Regional Rail Reorganization
Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974)).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol27/iss2/6

18

Sollars: Natural Resources - To Take or Not To Take - Was That Question Re
1992

CASENOTE

izens, transforming it by sale or exchange from one kind of property
to another, without necessarily effecting a taking, at least as long as it
is not acting in entire disregard of the owner's interest."' 60 In the Regional Rail Cases, the Supreme Court noted that the judiciary is responsible for ensuring constitutional compliance with the amount of
compensation but that Congress can dictate the mode.' 6 '
Nonwithstanding the lack of analyses by the Whitney Benefits'
decisions, the coal exchange program was plainly intended as the
mode of compensation. Instead of recognizing this fact, the courts,
having found a taking, blazed forward with a pecuniary compensation.
Perhaps this determination is the basis for the Claims Court's decision to award Whitney Benefits compensation for the entire reserve,
rather than limiting the amount to the permit application.
Although the Claims Court conducted a thorough review of the
Boyd Plan'"' and other measures of compensation, the fact remains
that the calculation contains assumptions and predictions.' 3 Perhaps
the most uncertain assumption is that a willing buyer would have paid
for the entire reserves. As reflected by the record, the Whitney Benefits, Inc. reserves were leased, not purchased, and the payment plan
concerned "advance and operating royalties."'"" It stands to reason
that the compensation should have been made on similar incremental
bases. In this manner, adjustments could be made for true market
conditions and the possibility that the AVF could be mined in the
future. The award would more accurately reflect Whitney Benefits'
claim that the enactment of SMCRA precluded the company from
mining.
Additionally, providing incremental awards would have been consistent with the Claims Court's own precedent. In Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States,' 6 the Claims Court found a taking but
150. Id. The court minimized this point because "[t]he government makes no contention that it is entitled to take over and manage the property of [Whitney Benefits]
...on the above grounds, or any others of the same nature." Id. Apparently, because
the government did not present the analogy, the court was unwilling to discuss it:
"[tiherefore, cases such as [Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases] . . .have no bearing on the right of the government to impose a substitution here." Id. at 1557-58.
151. Regional Rail Reorganization Cases, 419 U.S. at 151 n.39. The Supreme
Court stated that the clear implication of its decisions was that pecuniary compensation was not the only method of payment for Fifth Amendment claims. Id. at 151.
152. See supra note 37.
153. In Whitney Benefits II, the Claims Court discussed the economic impact on
the basis of potential contracts. Whitney Benefits H, 18 Cl. Ct. at 400-02. In its valuation section, the court necessarily relied on the potential contracts to ascertain the
value of the reserves. Id. at 407-16.
154. Id. at 397.
155. 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied 4779 U.S. 1053 (1987). In Florida
Rock, the plaintiffs bought a tract of land to mine limestone. Later promulgation of
wetlands protection measures prohibited Florida Rock from mining. The Claims Court
determined a regulatory taking had resulted but restricted the compensation to the
three year permit term. The plaintiffs recovered for 98 acres of the total 1,560 acres
proposed for mining. Id.
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limited the award to the scope of mining sought in the plaintiff's permit. Concerning Whitney Benefits, the first mining permit application
involved only part of the reserves.'" 6 The entire reserves were not considered until Whitney Benefits entered the coal exchange program.
Apparently, the Claims Court used the full-replacement intent of the
coal exchange program to measure compensation.' 7
The varied and inconsistent treatment of the coal exchange program suggests that the courts were willing to circumvent the facts to
provide a pecuniary compensation to Whitney Benefits. Perhaps the
government's varied and inconsistent treatment of Whitney Benefits
influenced the courts' decisions as well.
Other Possible Reasons for the Result-Orientated Decision
The Whitney Benefits III court capsulated the trilogy's attitude
that the government mishandled Whitney Benefits' coal exchange
pursuit. The federal circuit court declared that the government has
"carried its attempt to deny the impact of SMCRA on Whitney coal
to unreasonable lengths in an apparent hope of postponing the day of
reckoning into eternity. In this case, it has taken that tactic too
far."' 5 A review of the facts readily demonstrates the problems that
plagued Whitney Benefits' coal exchange.' 56 But however egregious
the governmental agency's actions may have been, that should not
provide the Claims Court and the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit with the license to circumvent the takings doctrine.
Because the Claims Court has exclusive jurisdiction of Fifth
Amendment governmental takings claims,'6 0 the Claims Court and the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit'61 are in a unique position to
further shape the takings doctrine. As noted by one commentator, the
exclusive jurisdiction "[i]nsures that the Claims Court will have the
last word on the factually intensive inquiry into whether the government's regulatory action gives rise to a just compensation claim."' 2 In
156. The 1976 permit application to the Wyoming DEQ proposed to mine only
the East Whitney area. Whitney Benefits 1I, 18 Cl. Ct. at 397.
157. See generally Whitney Benefits II, 18 Cl. Ct. at 407-16 (valuation section).
158. Whitney Benefits 111, 926 F.2d at 1173.
159. The trial transcript and other information from the district court provide a
broad, and not very flattering, view into the government's handling of the coal exchange attempt. See supra notes 18, 22 (noting the government's delay of beginning
the exchange program). Not only was Whitney Benefits' entrance into the program
delayed, but the BLM was unwilling to ascribe value to the coal at the time of SMCRA's passage. Instead, the BLM assigned a lesser value that correlated with the district court's 1985 demand of compliance. Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. Hodel, No. C84193-K, slip op. at 3-4 (D. Wyo. Dec. 3, 1985) (Order Ruling on Motion to Compel
Compliance). The district court was not swayed by the Secretary's timing interpretation of the coal exchange program. Id. at 7-8.
160. Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1988).
161. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit retains exclusive jurisdiction of
appeals from the Claims Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) (1988).
162. Roger J. Marzulla & Nancie G. Marzulla, United States Claims Court Sym-
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fact, it is often the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit which has
the "last laugh" since the Supreme Court has consistently denied petitions for writ of certiorari from that court.' Given their power, it is
critical that both the Claims Court and the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit adhere staunchly to the established takings doctrine. ' 4 However, the Whitney Benefits trilogy was reluctant to do so.
The trilogy ignored the economic elements of Penn Central and instead, fashioned an equitable remedy to compensate for the government's procrastination." 5
CONCLUSION

No one would disagree that $140 million is a substantial amount
of money, and for that reason, Whitney Benefits III may be called a
landmark decision. However, Whitney Benefits III is a landmine decision for the takings doctrine. The Whitney Benefits trilogy blazed
new territory for Claims Court decisions by sidestepping the economic
factor test of Penn Central. The latter two members of the trilogy did
not recognize the "things of value" that Whitney Benefits did retain:
the right to mine coal and the ability to use the surface property. Furthermore, the courts ignored Congress' intent in enacting the coal exchange program and instead, fashioned their own pecuniary compensation remedy. To add another layer of inconsistency, the Whitney
Benefits I court expanded its own limits of compensation.
Perhaps the Whitney Benefits trilogy decided to analyze the takings claims on its own terms to convey a warning signal for regulatory
programs as a whole. The message seems to be that if governmental
agency (in)actions appear to treat property owners inequitably, the

posium: Article: Regulatory Takings in the United States Claims Court: Adjusting
the Burdens that in Fairness and Equity Ought to be Borne by Society as a Whole,
40 CATH. U. L. REV. 549, 549 (1991).

163. Marzulla & Marzulla, supra note 162 at 549-50 and n.5.
164. This does not always appear to be the case. In its appeal to the Whitney
Benefits III court, the government used the holdings of earlier Supreme Court cases to
emphasize the exercise of police power. The court cavalierly dismissed a discussion of
the government's argument in a footnote: "The government's true complaint is that
the Claims Court relied on modern Supreme Court cases ... Amicus' brief presents a
thorough review of the metamorphosis of takings jurisprudence .... " Whitney Benefits I1, 926 F.2d at 1177 n.10. If the court was confident that the government's citations to Mugler and Miller were wrong, the court should have discussed this; the deference to the amicus brief does little for the court's takings analysis.
165. Also, the Claims Court may have been influenced by Executive Order 12,630,
Government Actions and Interference with Constitutionally Protected Property
Rights, which was issued prior to the decisions of both the Claims Court and the second federal circuit court. Exec. Order No. 12,630, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988).
The Executive Order notes specifically that "undue delays in decision making ... carry
a risk of being held to be takings." Id. § 3(d). The Order further discusses the permitting process and the need to avoid delays. Id. § 4(c). For general discussions of the
Executive Order, see Marzulla & Marzulla, supra note 162, at 566-69; Roger J.
Marzulla, The New "Takings" Executive Order and Environmental Regulation-Collision or Cooperation?, 18 ENVT'L. L. REP. 10,254 (1988).
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court will maneuver the takings doctrine and selectively use congressional intent to find a taking. In the Whitney Benefits litigation, the
question was not "to take or not to take" but rather "how much will it
take" for the agencies to listen.
Postscript
The parties of the Whitney Benefits litigation obviously agree
that the Whitney Benefits award is a substantial amount of money.
Promptly after the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari of
the case, PKS filed a motion in the Claims Court to request apportionment of the award."" In April 1992, the plaintiffs settled their dispute, and agreed that Whitney Benefits, Inc. would receive 32.5 percent and PKS would acquire 67.5 percent.1 6 7 However, the plaintiffs
will not receive their respective proportions in the very near future. In
March 1992, the federal government filed a motion for a new trial in
the Claims Court, seeking a reevaluation of the $60.3 million takings
award.' On April 7, 1992, the Claims Court directed the plaintiffs to
respond to the government's motion for a new trial.le
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166. Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, No. 499-83L, 1992 U.S. Cl. Ct. Lexis
41, at #1 (Cl. Ct. Feb. 18, 1992).
167. Whitney, Kiewit divvy up judgment, CASPER STAR-TRIB. (Wyo.), Apr. 7,
1992, at B1. The final award may exceed $200 million, depending on the interest calculation. Id.
168. Government wants judgment reviewed, CASPER STAR-TRIB. (Wyo.), Mar. 29,
1992, at B1. The Claims Court awarded $60,296,000 for the mineral reserves. See
supra text accompanying note 37.
169. Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, No. 83-499L (Cl. Ct. Apr. 7, 1992)
(order requiring responses to defendant's motion for new trial on valuation).
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